Seventh Circuit: Email Service on Chinese Sellers in Schedule A Cases Does Not Satisfy the Hague Service Convention

On May 29, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued a decision that cross-border e-commerce sellers should note. For Chinese sellers who have been sued in U.S. Schedule A actions, had listings frozen, or had account funds levied, the decision may carry real practical significance.

Its core holding: where the Hague Service Convention applies, serving process on a defendant located in China by email alone does not satisfy the Convention. In other words, the practice of "email service," long common in some Schedule A cases, has now been expressly limited by the court of appeals — at least within the Seventh Circuit. Since the decision issued, judges in the Northern District of Illinois have denied similar applications on its authority.

This note addresses, in turn: the course of the case; the Seventh Circuit's analysis of email service and the key premise it preserved; how lower courts have applied the decision; and its potential effect on Chinese sellers currently defending, or already subject to default judgments.

I. Background: From Email Service to Default Judgment

The facts below are drawn from the Seventh Circuit's opinion and the district court's rulings.

The case is Kangol LLC v. Hangzhou Chuanyue Silk Import & Export Co., Ltd., Seventh Circuit No. 25-2205, from the Northern District of Illinois, No. 24-cv-01636 (Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman).

Kangol is an apparel brand known for its kangaroo logo mark. In February 2024, Kangol sued in the Northern District of Illinois, naming numerous e-commerce sellers as defendants and asserting trademark infringement and counterfeiting claims. According to the complaint, most defendants were located in China, among them Hangzhou Chuanyue.

The case followed the typical Schedule A pattern: the plaintiff listed multiple defendants on a schedule filed with the complaint, moved for a temporary restraining order, and asked the court for leave to serve by email, arguing that the defendants operated through online platforms and that their true identities and addresses were difficult to confirm. The district court granted the applications. In April of that year, the plaintiff sent Hangzhou Chuanyue an email containing links to the complaint, the TRO, and the summons.

According to the opinion, Hangzhou Chuanyue contacted the plaintiff to discuss settlement the same day it received the email. Negotiations continued for several months, during which Hangzhou Chuanyue had actual knowledge of the action — but it never formally appeared.

In May 2024, the district court entered a default judgment and ordered third parties to turn over the seller's funds to satisfy it. In early 2025, the plaintiff levied on funds in Hangzhou Chuanyue's Amazon account.

After the levy, Hangzhou Chuanyue appeared and moved to set aside the default judgment, principally on the ground that, under the Hague Service Convention, service on a defendant located in China may not be effected by email; service was therefore invalid and the default judgment should be set aside. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that the Convention did not preclude email service in China.

Hangzhou Chuanyue appealed. The Seventh Circuit reversed.

II. The Seventh Circuit's Analysis: Email Service Is Not Within the Convention

The court's analysis proceeded in three steps.

First, the Hague Service Convention is exclusive within its scope. Both the United States and China are parties. Under Supreme Court precedent, where the Convention applies, service abroad must proceed by a method the Convention provides; a court may not create or authorize methods outside it.

Second, the Convention's text does not authorize service by email. The closest provision a plaintiff might invoke is Article 10(a), permitting the sending of judicial documents abroad by "postal channels" — but that provision itself is conditioned on the destination state not having objected.

Third, China has expressly objected to the methods in Article 10, on a public and formal official record. Accordingly, even if email were treated as analogous to a "postal channel," that route is unavailable in China because of the objection.

The Seventh Circuit therefore held that, where the Convention applies, serving a Chinese defendant with process by email does not satisfy it — and correspondingly, that a default judgment resting on invalid service may itself be subject to being set aside, or void.

The plaintiff also argued that Hangzhou Chuanyue, having engaged in settlement negotiations for months after receiving the email, raised its service objection only ten months later and had therefore been untimely. The Seventh Circuit did not accept that argument.

Participating in settlement discussions does not by itself waive a service objection, the court held; and under recent Supreme Court authority from 2026, a defaulted defendant may move to set aside a default judgment after the plaintiff has actually begun enforcement and levied on funds. The opinion notes that Hangzhou Chuanyue moved roughly two months after the levy, which was not a delay.

III. The Question the Decision Leaves Open: Whether the Defendant's Address Is "Known"

Importantly, the Seventh Circuit did not declare all email service on Chinese defendants invalid. The decision preserves a significant premise: email service is subject to these limits only where the Hague Service Convention applies.

Under Article 1, the Convention applies where a judicial or extrajudicial document must be transmitted abroad for service and the address of the person to be served is known. Where the address is genuinely unknown, the Convention does not apply — and a U.S. court may still permit email or other alternative service under domestic procedural rules.

That premise became the plaintiff's principal ground on remand. According to the opinion, the plaintiff argued that it had investigated Hangzhou Chuanyue's address, that the addresses it located were inconsistent, and that some appeared to be open-air market stalls — so the address should be deemed unknown. Hangzhou Chuanyue responded that its corporate address was genuine, specific, and publicly ascertainable.

The Seventh Circuit concluded that the district court had not adequately examined whether the plaintiff had exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to locate the address, and had instead simply found email service workable. It remanded that question for further proceedings. The central issue at the next stage will therefore no longer be whether email service is permissible as such, but whether the plaintiff, after reasonable investigation, was genuinely unable to determine the defendant's address.

This article addresses general legal questions only and does not constitute legal advice on any specific matter. Outcomes depend on the specific facts, evidence, applicable law, and the court's discretion.