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Mandatory Reporting to the CPSC: Triggers, the 24-Hour Deadline, and the Continuing Nature of the Duty

Author

Hongchang Deng · 邓宏昌

美国(加州)执业律师(Bar #354529)· USPTO · 中国专利代理师

 

Yi Yi · 易伊

美国(加州)执业律师

Published

2026-08-07 · 24 min read

TL;DR

Section 15(b) of the Consumer Product Safety Act requires immediate reporting once a seller has information that reasonably supports certain conclusions — a low threshold, a 24-hour clock, and, under Seventh Circuit authority, a duty that continues until discharged.

For cross-border e-commerce sellers shipping consumer products into the U.S. market, the mandatory reporting duty under Section 15(b) of the Consumer Product Safety Act ("CPSA") is a compliance requirement that is easy to overlook and potentially severe in consequence. Under that section, covered parties must report to the Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC") immediately upon obtaining "information which reasonably supports the conclusion" that a product presents certain problems.

This note addresses, in turn: the statutory basis and triggers for the duty; the "immediate" timing requirement and the continuing nature of the obligation; the limited circumstances in which the duty is discharged; the distinction between the Section 6(b) disclosure process and the Section 15(b) reporting duty; and what the relevant case law may mean for cross-border sellers. This is a general overview of the applicable provisions, not legal advice on any particular matter.

I. Statutory Basis and Triggers

The duty rests on 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b) (CPSA § 15(b)). Under that provision, every manufacturer, importer, distributor, and retailer of a consumer product must report upon obtaining information which reasonably supports any of four conclusions:

  1. the product fails to comply with an applicable consumer product safety rule or with a voluntary consumer product safety standard;
  2. the product fails to comply with any other rule, regulation, standard, or ban under the CPSA or any other act enforced by the CPSC;
  3. the product contains a defect which could create a substantial product hazard; or
  4. the product creates an unreasonable risk of serious injury or death.

A "substantial product hazard" is defined in § 2064(a) as a product defect that, because of the pattern of defect, the number of defective products distributed in commerce, the severity of the risk, or otherwise, creates a substantial risk of injury to the public.

The reporting threshold is comparatively low. The trigger is obtaining information that reasonably supports one of those conclusions — not confirmation that the product is in fact defective. Whether a report is required turns on whether the available information reasonably supports the conclusion, not on whether the defect has been finally established. U.S. courts have observed that a party may bear liability for failing to report in a timely manner even where the product is later determined not to have been defective.

II. "Immediately" and the Continuing Nature of the Duty

Section 15(b) requires reporting "immediately." In its implementing regulation, 16 C.F.R. § 1115.14(e), the CPSC defines "immediately" as within 24 hours of obtaining reportable information. In addition, under 16 C.F.R. § 1115.4, a party in doubt as to whether a defect could present a substantial product hazard should report.

A question sellers often raise is whether this is a periodic filing obligation. Under the current rules, Section 15(b) imposes no recurring filing requirement; it requires an initial report within 24 hours of obtaining the information, and that duty continues until lawfully discharged.

Federal courts have addressed that continuing character directly. In United States v. Spectrum Brands, Inc., the district court[1] held that the Section 15(b) duty is a continuing one: a failure to report is not "complete" until the party finally submits a report or has actual knowledge that the CPSC has been adequately informed of the defect, and the limitations period runs accordingly. In 2019, the Seventh Circuit[2] affirmed, holding that the Section 15(b) duty is continuing — a reporting violation is not consummated once 24 hours pass without a report, but continues until the party finally reports or knows the Commission has been adequately informed.

In other words, under that authority, a failure to report is not a single act at a point in time but a state that may continue to accumulate.

III. The Limited Circumstances Discharging the Duty

The Section 15(b) duty is not perpetual in all circumstances, but the conditions for discharge are narrow. Under 16 C.F.R. § 1115.3(a), the CPSC is "adequately informed" in only two situations: where it has received the information the party was required to submit under §§ 1115.12 and 1115.13 (that is, the party has filed a Section 15 report), or where the CPSC has expressly advised the party that it has been adequately informed. In addition, under 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b) and 16 C.F.R. § 1115.10(f), discharge also requires the party's "actual knowledge" of that adequate information. Both elements must be satisfied: the CPSC must objectively have been adequately informed, and the party must subjectively know it. Spectrum Brands confirmed that standard.

A related question is whether a CPSC letter to a company about a consumer complaint itself discharges the duty. In United States v. Mirama Enterprises, Inc., the district court[3] held that a CPSC letter to a company regarding a consumer complaint does not by itself relieve the company of its reporting obligation unless the only information the company possesses is identical to the Commission's. Spectrum Brands framed that as an "overlapping knowledge" test and held that, so long as the party possesses more information than the CPSC's letter disclosed, the duty is not discharged by the letter.

In practice, the information a party holds — total units sold, quantity in distribution, the complete product and its instructions, results of testing it commissioned, and other complaint or return records — will typically exceed what a single CPSC letter discloses. On that standard, such a letter will generally not discharge the duty.

IV. Section 6(b) Disclosure vs. the Section 15(b) Reporting Duty

A point of confusion in practice, and an important one, is the distinction between the CPSA's Section 6(b) disclosure process and the Section 15(b) reporting duty. They differ in direction, purpose, and effect.

Section 6(b) governs the CPSC's own public disclosure of information. Under that section and its regulations, before publicly disclosing information identifying a manufacturer or private labeler, the CPSC must take reasonable steps to ensure the information is accurate, that disclosure is fair and reasonably related to the purposes of the CPSA, and must notify the party in advance and give it an opportunity to comment on accuracy (generally at least 15 days from notice). The direction of Section 6(b) is the CPSC soliciting comment from the party.

Section 15(b) governs the party's affirmative duty to report to the CPSC — the opposite direction.

It follows that receiving a Section 6(b) disclosure notice or request for comment is not the same as having satisfied Section 15(b), nor does it by itself constitute the CPSC advising the party that it is adequately informed. In fact, such CPSC letters routinely remind the recipient of its Section 15(b) obligations. Treating a Section 6(b) notice as meaning the Commission already knows and no report is needed may therefore be mistaken.

V. What This May Mean for Cross-Border Sellers

Taken together, the following points may be of practical use to sellers shipping consumer products into the U.S. market.

First, establish the information-collection and assessment mechanism. Consumer complaints, stated reasons for returns, platform safety notices or delisting notices, insurance and claim notices, and CPSC correspondence may all constitute information reasonably supporting the relevant conclusions. These should be collected centrally and assessed promptly.

Second, distinguish Section 6(b) from Section 15(b). On receiving CPSC correspondence, first determine which it is; responding to a Section 6(b) process is not the same as discharging Section 15(b).

Third, testing or certification does not by itself discharge the duty. Compliance with a test standard and whether a product has a reportable defect or risk are different questions.

Fourth, discharge generally has only two routes under the current rules: filing a Section 15 report, or receiving express advice that the CPSC is adequately informed. A party's own assessment that no report is needed will generally not suffice.

Fifth, note the continuing nature of the duty and of the limitations period. Under the authority above, a failure to report persists until lawfully discharged; delay does not generally cause the exposure to lapse with time.

Sixth, Chinese entities and individuals may be subject to U.S. civil and even criminal exposure. Being located outside the United States does not by itself preclude liability.

Whether particular information has crossed the "reasonably supports" threshold, whether a report is required, and how to report will often turn on the specific facts and warrant careful assessment with counsel. For sellers who have received CPSC correspondence, or where a serious injury has occurred, prompt assessment of whether to file a Section 15(b) report and whether to initiate a voluntary recall or corrective action is particularly important.


[1] United States v. Spectrum Brands, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 3d 794 (W.D. Wis. 2016). [2] United States v. Spectrum Brands, Inc., 924 F.3d 337 (7th Cir. 2019). [3] United States v. Mirama Enters., Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (S.D. Cal. 2002), aff'd, 387 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2004).

This article addresses general legal questions only and does not constitute legal advice on any specific matter. Outcomes depend on the specific facts, evidence, applicable law, and the court's discretion.

关于作者 / About the Authors

Richard Deng

Partner · LawMay P.C.

邓律师主要从事中国及美国商品及服务争议解决,以及专利、商标、版权、商业秘密等涉外知识产权诉讼与无效确权业务,并办理中美商标申请及中国专利申请。常年服务跨境工贸企业、跨境电商、电子烟行业、科技制造业等领域,为财富 500 强、国际连锁品牌、出海科技品牌等多家中外知名企业提供常年及专项法律服务。

在跨境电商争议领域,邓律师专注 Schedule A 批量诉讼的被告应对,包括临时限制令(TRO)项下的店铺账户与资金解冻、通过确认不侵权之诉(Declaratory Judgment,DJ)与「反向 TRO」动议争取恢复被下架的商品链接与店铺经营,以及亚马逊账户冻结申诉、品牌备案(Brand Registry)争议等平台纠纷的代理。在华盛顿州西区联邦法院,邓律师代理多起确认不侵权之诉(DJ),取得了恢复商品上架、并禁止对方继续投诉的「反向 TRO」与「反向初步禁令(反向 PI)」。他熟悉 Schedule A 案件高发的伊利诺伊州北区、佛州南区等联邦法院的程序节奏,能在中美时差下迅速响应、把握应诉与和解的时间窗口。

在涉外电子烟与 FDA 监管领域,邓律师为电子烟及新型烟草企业提供覆盖确权、合规到维权的全流程代理,涵盖行业知识产权维权与 337 调查、PMTA 上市前申请与 STN 状态争议、FDA 执法防御(警告信、营销拒绝令 MDO、进口扣留 Import Alert),以及美国海关(CBP)清关合规与扣押货物申诉。

他代理的知识产权相关案件多次荣获「广东省知识产权行政保护典型案例」「广东省商业秘密保护大事件」、「深圳律师承办知识产权十大典型案例」、「深圳市侵害商业秘密典型案例」、「深圳律师国际贸易、投资领域典型案例」、「广东知识产权保护协会年度知识产权推荐学习案例」等专业荣誉。

他代理的商品及服务贸易纠纷、知识产权等争议解决案件涉案标的额总计达数十亿元人民币。

美国联邦知识产权诉讼 · 跨境工贸与电商争议 · 电子烟与 FDA 监管 · 商业秘密与不正当竞争

Rdeng@lawmayus.com

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Yi Yi

Non-Equity Partner · LawMay P.C.

易伊是美国加利福尼亚州执业律师,执业领域主要包括美国联邦法院知识产权诉讼、跨境电商争议、产品责任纠纷及联邦上诉案件。易伊代理中国及其他国际客户处理专利侵权、商标及著作权争议、产品责任纠纷、临时限制令与初步禁令、网络平台知识产权执法及其他跨境商事纠纷。

易伊经常协助客户应对临时限制令及初步禁令申请,挑战不当的管辖权主张,制定专利不侵权及无效抗辩,并协调中美两地的诉讼策略。易伊亦为跨境电商企业就知识产权执法、平台账户及商品链接争议、产品责任索赔及相关诉讼风险提供法律服务。

易伊具备在美国联邦巡回上诉法院、美国第十一巡回上诉法院、加州中区、北区联邦地区法院及德克萨斯东区、南区、伊利诺伊州北区联邦地区法院的出庭经验(涵盖正式执业资格与临时出庭许可 Pro Hac Vice / PHV 两种形式)。易伊亦办理美国专利商标局商标申请事务,并为美国知识产权法律协会会员。

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